考虑牛鞭效应与反牛鞭效应联合作用在不完美信息下供应链决策者的合作博弈与演进

理性假设下,供应链运作过程中出现牛鞭效应也会出现反牛鞭效应,在考虑牛鞭效应与反牛鞭效应联合作用下分别构建二级供应链合作博弈模型与n级供应链合作博弈模型,得到Nash均衡策略,构建合作Nash均衡下供应链上订货模型,并通过数值算例验证订货模型及牛鞭效应特性与反牛鞭效应特性交替作用的最优化局势优于传统视角的消除牛鞭效应带来的供应链优化.研究表明:供应链上下游在周期内表现出牛鞭效应特性与反牛鞭效应特性的交替作用,会使得供应链整体上市场需求偏差减少、运作成本降低.贡献在于给出消除牛鞭效应的新思路,从整体上消除牛鞭效应或反牛鞭效应,使得整条供应链不管是短期的还是长期都是最优的,在长期还会给供应链企业带来显著的战略优势.     

A polynomial expression for the Owen value in the maintenance cost game

The class of maintenance cost games was introduced in 2000 to deal with a cost allocation problem arising in the reorganization of the railway system in Europe. The main application of maintenance cost games regards the allocation of the maintenance costs of a facility among the agents using it. To that aim it was first proposed to utilize the Shapley value, whose computation for maintenance cost games can be made in polynomial time. In this paper, we propose to model this cost allocation problem as a maintenance cost game with a priori unions and to use the Owen value as a cost allocation rule. Although the computation of the Owen value has exponential complexity in general, we provide an expression for the Owen value of a maintenance cost game with cubic polynomial complexity. We finish the paper with an illustrative example using data taken from the literature of railways management.     

Quiz games as a model for information hiding

We present a general computation model inspired in the notion of information hiding in software engineering. This model has the form of a game which we call quiz game. It allows in a uniform way to prove exponential lower bounds for several complexity problems.     

Some properties for probabilistic and multinomial (probabilistic) values on cooperative games

We investigate the conditions for the coefficients of probabilistic and multinomial values of cooperative games necessary and/or sufficient in order to satisfy some properties, including marginal contributions, balanced contributions, desirability relation and null player exclusion property. Moreover, a similar analysis is conducted for transfer property of probabilistic power indices on the domain of simple games.     

不完全契约下政府实施公共品负担对私人部门行为选择影响机制研究

政府部门往往会承担公共品负担提高社会公共福利和满足社会诉求,私人部门在PPP项目建设运营中会采取机会主义行为损害政府部门利益和降低社会福利。本文运用演化博弈分析私人部门的机会主义行为演化机制。通过模型分析可得,当政府补贴系数低于一定程度时,私人部门采取机会主义行为的概率随着公共品负担强度的增加而增加;当政府实施公共品负担小于一定强度时,私人部门会随着政府补贴程度提高而不采取机会主义行为,而当公共品负担强度大于一定值时,政府补贴政策正相关性就被严重削弱;私人部门占据更多的利益分配比重,更有倾向采取机会主义行为。根据研究结果,政府部门应增强契约精神,公共品负担下,政府补贴并不能有效降低机会主义行为,而应完善监管机制和提升私人部门对项目收益的信心。     

基于模糊博弈视角的企业联盟“双循环”合作对策研究

企业合作在“双循环”新发展格局下呈现出更多的模糊特征,能否形成稳定的模糊合作格局及持续合作的收益再分配策略成为合作联盟的关注点。将广义模糊超量博弈和模糊凸博弈及其广义解集应用到“双循环”新发展格局下企业联盟合作与收益再分配中,提出最大广义模糊超量博弈模型及其广义模糊谈判集,并基于最大广义模糊超量博弈均衡性的视角,对模糊凸博弈下广义模糊谈判集与核心的等价性质进行论证。研究结果不仅满足了“双循环”新发展格局下合作企业以部分资源参与合作的意愿,及企业联盟模糊凸合作博弈下再分配方案等价性证明需求,而且实现了保留部分收益用于联盟再发展的策略。     

Efficiency of Classical and Quantum Games Equilibria

Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria of classical and quantum games are investigated in the context of their Pareto efficiency. The examples of the prisoner’s dilemma, battle of the sexes and the game of chicken are studied. Correlated equilibria usually improve Nash equilibria of games but require a trusted correlation device susceptible to manipulation. The quantum extension of these games in the Eisert–Wilkens–Lewenstein formalism and the Frąckiewicz–Pykacz parameterization is analyzed. It is shown that the Nash equilibria of these games in quantum mixed Pauli strategies are closer to Pareto optimal results than their classical counter-parts. The relationship of mixed Pauli strategies equilibria and correlated equilibria is also studied.     

Effects of Some Topological Ingredients on the Evolutionary Ultimatum Game

This study aims at figuring out the crucial topological ingredients which affect the outcomes of the ultimatum game located on different networks,encompassing the regular network,the random network,the small world network,and the scale-free network.With the aid of random interchanging algorithm,we investigate the relations between the outcomes of the ultimatum game and some topological ingredients,including the average range,the clustering coefficient and the heterogeneity,and so forth.It is found that for the regular,random and small-work networks,the average range and the clustering coefficient have evident impacts on the ultimatum game,while for the scale-free network the original degree heterogeneity and the underlying rich-club characterizations are the mainly important topologica ingredients that influence the outcomes of ultimatum game substantially.     

Multi-armed spirals and multi-pairs antispirals in spatial rock–paper–scissors games

We study the formation of multi-armed spirals and multi-pairs antispirals in spatial rock–paper–scissors games with mobile individuals. We discover a set of seed distributions of species, which is able to produce multi-armed spirals and multi-pairs antispirals with a finite number of arms and pairs based on stochastic processes. The joint spiral waves are also predicted by a theoretical model based on partial differential equations associated with specific initial conditions. The spatial entropy of patterns is introduced to differentiate the multi-armed spirals and multi-pairs antispirals. For the given mobility, the spatial entropy of multi-armed spirals is higher than that of single armed spirals. The stability of the waves is explored with respect to individual mobility. Particularly, we find that both two armed spirals and one pair antispirals transform to the single armed spirals. Furthermore, multi-armed spirals and multi-pairs antispirals are relatively stable for intermediate mobility. The joint spirals with lower numbers of arms and pairs are relatively more stable than those with higher numbers of arms and pairs. In addition, comparing to large amount of previous work, we employ the no flux boundary conditions which enables quantitative studies of pattern formation and stability in the system of stochastic interactions in the absence of excitable media.     

Quantum strategies win in a defector-dominated population

Quantum strategies are introduced into evolutionary games. The agents using quantum strategies are regarded as invaders, whose fraction generally is 1% of a population, in contrast to the 50% of the population that are defectors. In this paper, the evolution of strategies on networks is investigated in a defector-dominated population, when three networks (square lattice, Newman–Watts small-world network, and scale-free network) are constructed and three games (Prisoners’ Dilemma, Snowdrift, and Stag-Hunt) are employed. As far as these three games are concerned, the results show that quantum strategies can always invade the population successfully. Comparing the three networks, we find that the square lattice is most easily invaded by agents that adopt quantum strategies. However, a scale-free network can be invaded by agents adopting quantum strategies only if a hub is occupied by an agent with a quantum strategy or if the fraction of agents with quantum strategies in the population is significant.